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Abstract  
When assessing decisional competence of patients, psychiatrists have to balance the 
patients' right to personal autonomy, their condition and wishes against principles of 
medical ethics and professional discretion. This article explores the age-old legal and 
ethical dilemmas posed by refusal of vital medical treatment by patients and their 
mental capacity to make end-of-life decisions against the background of 
philosophical, legal and medical approaches to these issues in the time of the Younger 
Pliny (c62–c113 CE). Classical Roman discourse regarding mental competency and 
"voluntary death" formed an important theme of the vast corpus of Greco-Roman 
writings, which was moulded not only by legal permissibility of suicide but also by 
philosophical (in modern terms, moral or ethical) considerations. Indeed, the legal and 
ethical issues of evaluating the acceptability of end of life decisions discussed in the 
Letters are as pertinent today as they were 2000 years ago.  
We may gain valuable insights about our own methodologies and frames of reference 
in this area of the law and psychiatry by examining Classical Roman approaches to 
evaluating acceptability of death-choices as described in Pliny's Letters and the 
writings of some of his peers.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the past 100 years, countries which form part of the Western cultural tradition 
have adopted the bioethical doctrine of personal autonomy, or as lawyers call it, 
personal self-determination, as the basis for the law of refusal of medical treatment.1 
In general, competent adults have a legal right to personal self-determination that 
allows them to make voluntary choices, including the so-called death-choice.2 
According to Lord Goff of Chieveley in the English case of Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland,3 adult patients of sound mind have the right to refuse, “however unreasonably” 
life-prolonging medical treatment; and medical practitioners have the duty to give 
effect to these wishes, irrespective of whether the refusal of consent is in the patients' 
best interests. His Lordship concluded that, “to this extent, the principle of the sanctity 
of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination”.  
*202 Subsequently in Re MB (Medical Treatment)4, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 
President of the English Court of Appeal of England and Wales described the right to 
self-determination as “absolute”:  
A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to 
medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, 
even where that decision may lead to his or her own death.5 
In the United Kingdom, the common law approach to legal capacity has been codified 
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 c 9(UK),6 which provides that “a person must be 
assumed to have capacity until it is proved otherwise” (s 1(2)), and that “a person is 
not to be treated as lacking capacity to make a decision simply because he makes an 
unwise decision” (s 1(4)). According to the Explanatory Notes:  
this means that people have the right to make irrational or eccentric decisions 
that others may not judge to be in their best interests if they have the necessary 
ability to make the decision.7 
Thus, at least in the United Kingdom, rational basis for the decision is not a standard 
for the determination of its legal validity. The sole precondition to the exercise of the 
absolute right to refuse any medical therapy, including life-prolonging treatment is the 
person's mental capacity. For the purposes of the law, mental capacity has two 
elements: (a) capacity to understand or retain the data relevant to the decision, in 
particular, information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one 
way or another or failing to make the decision; and (b) ability to make a decision 
based on that information.8 The role of psychiatrists is to assess the decision-making 
capacity of the refusing patients.  
At least in the United Kingdom, the law explicitly provides that when assessing 
mental competence “subjective values [of the patient] have to be taken into account”.9 
This philosophical approach to competency was adopted by Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss, President of the English Court of Appeal, who in Ms B v An NHS Hospital 
Trust [2002] EWHC 429,10 incorporated into her judgment passages from Kim 
Atkins' article, “Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience”.11 According 
to Atkins, if it is accepted that “the subjective character of experience is irreducible” 
and “grounded in the particularity of our points of view”, then the respect for 
autonomy mandates both “recognition of the irreducible differences that separate us 
as subjects”, and “a respect for the particularity of each other's points of view”. This 
in turn, means that when a person refuses life-saving treatment, the decision should 
not be criticised on the grounds of insufficient objectivity, for:  
insisting that a decision be made from a fully objective perspective can only 
produce a decision that is further from the patient's own point of view, not 
closer to it.12 
Such a subjective – strictly autonomy-based – test is effectively self-referential. It 
reduces the juridical evaluation of the decision-making process to the narrowly 
defined question of legal capacity, and directs psychiatrists to exclude rationality of 
the final decision in their professional assessment of the patient's condition. The 
common law notion of “sound mind” based solely on cognitive competence is much 
more limited than the Roman idea of mens sana. While the term “autonomy” was not 
used by classical Greeks and Romans, their approach to the legal and ethical validity 
of death-choices through refusal of life-prolonging treatment was much broader.  
*203 In Classical Rome, freeborn Roman citizens enjoyed a legal right to refuse any 
medical treatment. Yet, the practical exercise of this right by the Romans was 
considerably qualified by social and ethical considerations, which emphasised the 
rationality of the final decision and required that it be virtuous. The aim of this essay 
is to examine these considerations. In my discussion, I shall utilise the Letters of Pliny 
the Younger and other philosophical and medical works of the period to examine 
social and legal attitudes to hastening of death in Rome of the Emperor Trajan (ruled 
98–117 CE), as well as the role and approach of Hippocratic physicians to their 
patients' end of life decisions.  
The essay will provide a brief biography of the Younger Pliny, a social background 
on people of his class and an analysis of the philosophical – moral – norms they were 
expected to adhere to, including decisions concerning end of life. Two of the Younger 
Pliny's Letters will be examined. The Letter to Catilius Severus about a medical 
condition of Titius Aristo will be analysed in the context of medical theories and 
ethical practices of the time as underpinned by law. The Letter to Calestrius Tiro will 
be considered in the light of legal, moral and social acceptability of motives and 
methods of “voluntary death”, in particular, the requirement that both the decision-
making process and the decision to exit life be strictly rational.  
2. Refusal of treatment in classical Greece and Rome  
The anxiety over medical, ethical and legal issues involved in refusal of life-
prolonging procedures is as old as the Western medical tradition. The Hippocratic 
Corpus13 contains discussions on whether physicians should treat terminally ill 
patients. Classical Greek and Roman writers analysed the issue of when, why and in 
what manner it would be acceptable for a competent person to voluntarily “exit 
life”.14  
The “Romans” referred to in the title of this essay were well educated freeborn male 
citizens who belonged to the social and cultural elite of the mid-first century and early 
second century CE. They all pursued cursus honorum,15 a professional career path, 
which often included legal practice. I chose this period primarily because of the 
insights provided by the writings of Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (c62–c113 CE), 
known as Pliny the Younger (Pliny).  
Like many members of his circle, Pliny was born into a patrician family of the 
equestrian rank.16 His parents were landowners in Comum near Lake Como. 
Following the death of his father, Lucius Caecilius Cilo, Gaius was adopted by his 
mother's brother, Pliny the Elder,17 a polymath and the greatest naturalist of the 
Antiquity. Pliny became an outstanding lawyer, and a distinguished senator, attaining 
consulship in 100 CE.18 Between 104 and 6 CE he was elected a chairman of the river 
Tiber Conservancy and Urban Sewage Board (curator alvei Tiberis et riparum et 
cloacarum urbis),19 and became a member of the imperial judicial council. In 110, 
Emperor Trajan appointed Pliny a Legate Propraetor for Bithynia-Pontus. He died in 
office while serving as the Emperor's representative with full consular powers, and a 
special commission to improve the governance of the province.20 Among Pliny's close 
personal friends was the lawyer and historian, Tacitus.21  
*204 Between 99 and 109 CE, Pliny published nine books of Letters (Epistulae);22 the 
tenth book spanning the period of 98–113 CE and containing his correspondence with 
Emperor Trajan was published posthumously. Pliny's Letters vividly portray his 
milieu, while providing an insightful commentary on many social, legal, political, 
cultural and moral (ethical) aspects of Roman life. For example, in his respective 
letters to Calestrius Tiro and to Catilius Severus, Pliny described how two of his sick 
friends (Corellius Rufus and Titius Aristo) determined whether or not to voluntarily 
exit life by refusing further treatment.  
3. Philosophical orientation as factor in decision-making  
Greco-Roman religion was essentially institutional and civic in nature. At least since 
the late Republic, many Romans looked towards Greek and Roman philosophers for 
ethical guidance regarding public and personal conduct; indeed, the teaching of 
rhetoric and philosophy formed an important part of education of children in the 
middle class and patrician households.23 In their communications Pliny, his friends 
and correspondents refer to the literary and philosophical – ethical – heritage of 
Greece, the “Golden Age” of the late Roman Republic, the Augustan era, as well as 
moral values espoused by their own vibrant intellectual environment. They considered 
philosophy to be an ethical system, which provided a moral “way of living”.24 Pliny's 
long standing friend, the philosopher Euphrates of Tyre,25 advised him that:  
anyone who holds public office, presides at trials and passes judgment, 
expounds and administers justice, and thereby puts into practice what the 
philosopher only teaches, has a part in the philosophic life and indeed the 
noblest part of all.26 
Euphrates was a Stoic. However, in Pliny's time, there were a number of different 
philosophical schools, and their impact on the Roman moral and legal discourse was 
not dissimilar to the influence that various religious denominations and socio-political 
doctrines exert of on modern jurisprudence and medical ethics. In particular, Romans 
tended to evaluate the acceptability of the choice to hasten one's death by reference to 
the hierarchy of moral and social values as systematized by different philosophical 
schools.  
Broadly, the most influential schools of the time included Epicureans, Cynics and 
Stoics. Epicureans27 considered that freedom from anxiety and fear of death and 
afterlife (eudaimonia) together with freedom from bodily pain (ataraxia) was the 
most desirable state of well-being. As long as life had pleasure left in it, Epicureans 
were expected to continue living.28 Hence, Epicureans were principally opposed to 
suicide,29 contending that those who were sufficiently schooled in Epicurean 
philosophy would be able to endure even severe pains. An Epicurean could 
contemplate leaving life only if the distress suffered was constant and unendurable, 
and the voluntary death was arrived at calmly and rationally (aequo animo)30 being 
“the result of a calculation that the alternative would be a continued life of pain.”31 
The Cynics32 focused on the individual and sanctioned suicide in cases of painful 
illness, old age, *205 unrequited love, and “as a way of avoiding compulsion to act 
contrary to one's rational judgment of what is right to do”.33 A number of ethical 
doctrines developed by the Cynics were incorporated into Stoicism by Zeno of Citium 
(336–264 BCE), though Stoics approved of suicide only if it fell into a category of a 
“sensible” or “reasonable removal” (Greek: eulogos exagoge).34 Zeno committed 
suicide when he was suffering from an agonizing foot injury.35 Stoic philosophy with 
its emphasis on reason (logos), physics, and practical ethics exerted profound 
influence on Roman upper classes (including jurists) of the late Republic and the first 
200 years of the Empire.36  
In general, Roman patricians who were not professional philosophers, tended to be 
eclectic in their adherence to philosophical schools. Pliny's Letters tend to reflect his 
sense of moral values and ethical principles derived from Stoic philosophy. The 
letters to Catilius Severus and to Calestrius Tiro respectively, involve the question of 
“how one should judge morally a decision to end one's life”.37  
4. Letter of Pliny the Younger to Catilius Severus and medical practice of the 
time  
The letter to Catilius Severus38 was probably written in late 90s, and concerned 
Pliny's visit to a sick friend and colleague, Titius Aristo. Like Pliny, Titius Aristo was 
an eminent lawyer, member of the imperial council (consilium), and a judicial adviser 
to the Emperor Trajan.39 He had been seriously ill for some time. On this occasion, 
Titius Aristo received his friends reclining on the sofa. Pliny writes admiringly about 
his friend's patience in overcoming the pain and thirst brought about by his febrile 
condition.  
The reason for this particular visit40 was Aristo's request that a group of “intimate 
friends” consult his physicians41 about the likely outcome of the disease. According to 
Pliny, if the physicians pronounced Titius Aristo's condition terminal, he would 
“deliberately put an end to his life”. The exact Latin phrase used by Pliny is “willingly 
exit life” (sponte exiret e vita).42 At the same time, Titius Aristo resolved that:  
he would carry on with the struggle if it was only to be long and painful; he 
owed it to his wife's prayers and his daughter's tears, and to us, his friends, not 
to betray our hopes by self inflicted death so long as these hopes were not in 
vain. 
Again, the exact phrase is “voluntary death” (voluntaria morte).43  
In other words, depending on the medical prognosis Titius Aristo would decide 
whether to willingly exit life by refusing further treatment. As related by Pliny, 
Aristo's decision-making process was in harmony with the practical ethics of Roman 
Stoic philosophy. In particular its concept of virtue, which Cicero defined as 
consisting of three properties:  
the first is the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, 
what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is, the 
ability to restrain the passions, which the Greeks call paqh (pathe), and make 
the *206 impulses (hormas) obedient to reason; and the third is, the skill to 
treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, …44 
Titius Aristo, having accepted the circumstances of his disease ‘with humility’, asked 
for and objectively analysed (rationally processed)45 the information provided by his 
physicians. When making the choice, he ensured that it was not impulsive, capricious, 
or selfish. His conduct was also ethical (virtuous) because in reaching his conclusion, 
he balanced his rights against his obligations: the right to personal self-determination, 
against the moral and social obligation not to inflict unnecessary anguish on one's 
family and friends.46  
The outcome of Titius Aristo's decision regarding voluntary death was predicated on 
the medical diagnosis and prognosis of his condition. There is no description of 
doctors attending Titius Aristo, who was probably either a freedman or descendant of 
a freed slave,47 and achieved professional success solely through his intellectual 
ability.48 Whom would he have chosen as his physicians?  
The practice of medicine at the time of Emperor Trajan was virtually unregulated. The 
rights and obligations of persons who claimed to practice medicine were determined 
by their legal status. Roman law treated differently doctors who were slaves (servi),49 
freedmen (liberti), and wealthy Roman citizens who practiced medicine (medici 
ingenui).50 Traditionally, Roman citizens practiced “paterfamilias” medicine, which 
was based on lore and natural remedies (mostly cabbage) as presented in the Naturalis 
historia of the Elder Pliny.51 However, the Elder Pliny's contemporary, Aulus 
Cornelius Celsus (c25 BCE–45 CE),52 a patrician author and encyclopaedist, seems to 
have been also a practicing physician in the Hippocratic tradition. In his extant work, 
De medicina, Celsus emphasised medical ethics, scientific observation and rational 
approach to the disease. Celsus considered that knowledge of anatomy, physiology 
and pharmacology was a prerequisite to good clinical practice, and that classification 
of the disease (diagnosis), and prediction of its course (prognosis) must precede 
treatment decisions.53  
As a Roman patrician, Celsus – the medicus ingenuus – was probably atypical. For in 
the first century CE, the vast majority of those who called themselves doctors (medici) 
were either freedmen or slaves.54 They tended to come from the Hellenistic East,55 
and were referred to collectively as “Greek”. Amongst them were charlatans, faith 
healers and gymnastic trainers, as well as highly educated specialist medical 
practitioners. Some of the best known general and specialist physicians of Antiquity 
practiced medicine in the first century Rome. They included Erotian (fl c 50 CE), the 
Hippocratic lexicographer and physician; Scribonius Largus, physician to Emperor 
Claudius (ruled 47–54 CE), who articulate the principle that “medicine is the science 
of healing, not harming”;56 Pedanius Discorides (fl c 40–90 CE), *207 physician and 
pharmacologist who around 64 CE published the famous and influential De materia 
medica; and the younger contemporary of Pliny, Soranus of Ephesus, who was 
regarded the pre-eminent physician of his day.57 Most educated physicians were 
adherents of one of various medical schools or sects. The Dogmatic, Methodist, 
Empiric and Pneumatic schools followed different strands of the Hippocratic 
tradition.58 However, there was a general agreement amongst the medical schools that 
in essence, the Hippocratic therapy consisted of three main elements: diet (including 
regimens of food and drink, bathing, massage, and exercise), medicines, and surgical 
procedures.59  
Hippocratic medicine in the sense of its ethical conduct was practiced by only a small 
minority of medical practitioners across the social spectrum; nonetheless, given that 
Titius Aristo's decision was predicated on the diagnosis and prognosis of his illness, 
he might have employed physicians from one of the Hippocratic schools. In Pliny's 
letter about Titius Aristo, the physicians are mentioned only in relation to their 
prognosis of his illness. The diagnosis was probably of an acute disease with positive 
prognosis, and Titius Aristo considered pain and distress due to a non-terminal illness 
not to be sufficient reasons for hastening death. Moreover, the treatment must have 
been successful because in one of the subsequent letters to Aristo, Pliny thanks him 
for a literary dinner party;60 and in another note he asks him for legal advice regarding 
the handling of voting procedures in the Roman Senate.61  
But if the prognosis were negative and the patient's death deemed inevitable, would 
Greco-Roman physicians of the Hippocratic tradition consider themselves under a 
duty to continue treatment? Probably not, for the Hippocratic axiom that: “regarding 
diseases, make practice of two things — to help, or at least do no harm”,62 did not 
imply an obligation to prolong the patient's life at any cost.63 The Hippocratic treatise 
On the Art defined the three fundamental duties of physicians as consisting of (1) 
alleviation of their patients' suffering; (2) lessening the violence of their diseases; and 
(3) refusal to treat those whose disease is too far advanced, conscious that in such 
cases medicine is powerless.64 Recognising the limits of medicine, Hippocratic 
physicians accepted that: “when disease exceeds the power of medicine to heal, it is 
the power of the disease not the lack of skill which is to blame.”65 Celsus in De 
medicina re-affirmed the Hippocratic approach when he wrote that medical 
practitioners:  
should know above all which wounds are incurable, which may be cured with 
difficulty, and which more readily. For it is the part of a prudent man first not 
to touch a case he cannot save, and to risk the appearance of having killed one 
whose lot is but to die.66 
Whereas the author of Hippocratic treatise On the Art focused on the limits of 
medicine in treatment of advanced and terminal disease and the attribution of death to 
the underlying illness in such cases, Celsus was concerned about possible legal 
consequences for physicians undertaking treatment of incurably ill patients who 
subsequently die. In both cases, however, the guiding principle of prognosis would 
have been a double-tier distinction between acute and chronic diseases on the one 
hand, and conditions that were capable or incapable of curing or stabilizing, on the 
other.  
5. Legal right to refuse treatment and ethical acceptability of such conduct  
Freeborn Roman citizens' right to refuse medical treatment was grounded in their 
legal status,67 which was protected by personal private (delictual) action for any 
wrongful interference with bodily integrity that was humiliating *208 to the victim 
(actio iniuriarum).68 The more violent forms of such interference, including striking, 
causing pain (verberare) were punishable under Lex Cornelia de iniuriis.69  
There is no indication in the letter of Pliny of the method Titius Aristo would have 
chosen to “willingly exit life” in the event of an unfavourable prognosis. Had he died 
as a result of refusal of treatment, the cause of his death would have been attributed to 
the disease. But, given his painful illness, had Titius Aristo pursued “voluntary death” 
even by some other means, with few exceptions, his conduct would have been lawful. 
Roman law provided that “if a person did not lay hands on himself through fear of 
imminent condemnation for a crime, but rather through weariness of life or the 
inability to endure pain, the manner of his death would not impede the opening of the 
will”.70 Likewise, a soldier who attempted to lay hands on himself and did not 
succeed, was to be punished by death unless he wished to die because of unbearable 
pains, sickness, affliction (mourning), or for another reason; in such cases he was to 
be dishonourably discharged.71  
However, although Roman citizens had a legal right to refuse life prolonging 
treatment, they were ethically constrained from exercising it irrationally or selfishly, 
on a whim. Indeed, if Titius Aristo decided to refuse medical treatment or to end his 
life in some other way for purely selfish reasons, his conduct though a legally 
permissible exercise of a right, would have been considered morally objectionable. 
Thus in the Roman world as in ours some legally permissible decisions were, 
nevertheless, morally or socially open to criticism.72 In Rome, moral opprobrium of 
voluntary death had social rather than legal implications.  
6. Letter of Pliny the Younger to Calestrius Tiro and methods of “voluntary 
death”  
As noted above, Roman attitudes to suicide varied;73 however, those Romans who 
condoned it, did so only if the “voluntary death” (voluntaria morte)74 had an 
acceptable motive and method.75 Apart from painful and incurable illness, in Rome of 
the late Republic and early Empire, suicide as a political act was perhaps the best 
known manifestation of an “acceptable motive”.76 Throughout the first century CE 
many members of the upper class committed suicide to avoid the notorious treason 
trials, which invariably led to execution, confiscation of property and prohibition of 
burial.77  
Death by a sword, cutting of veins, ingestion of poison,78 refusal of food,79 and refusal 
of medical treatment were tolerated as acceptable methods of ending one's life.80 
Some modern scholars argue that if asked, many doctors were ready to provide 
poisons for their terminally ill patients.81 For example, Ludwig Edelstein wrote that 
“in antiquity many physicians actually gave their patients the poison for which they 
were asked. Apparently qua physicians they felt no *209 compunction about doing 
so”.82 Edelstein refers to Tacitus, Annals XV.64 as his source. In this and surrounding 
passages, Tacitus describes the death of Seneca the Younger,83 who in 65 CE was 
ordered by Emperor Nero to commit suicide. In compliance, Seneca cut his wrists. 
The flow of blood was very slow, exhausting, and extremely painful. Seneca, 
concerned that he would loose self-composure, “entreated his well-tried doctor, who 
was also an old friend”, Annaeus Statius, to supply him with hemlock. Hemlock was 
the poison taken by Socrates,84 and Seneca procured the drug some years before in 
unknown circumstances. The doctor was clearly reluctant to administer the drug, for 
Seneca had to “entreat” him to do so. In the event, as Tacitus records, “when it came, 
Seneca drank it without effect”.85 The inadequacy of the dose suggests that Seneca did 
not procure the poison from, or on an advice of a doctor. If anything, the passage 
suggests that Roman doctors were unwilling to supply deadly drugs even to a person 
who was in the process of self-annihilation.  
Annaeus Statius' reluctance to administer hemlock might have been influenced by the 
fact that although Seneca initiated the process of “self-removal”, his suicide was not 
voluntary. It was an extra-judicial death-sentence imposed by Nero. If Seneca refused 
to comply, or failed to complete the act of self-killing, an imperial officer, who was 
present at the scene, would have escorted him to be killed at the place of public 
execution.86 The doctor might have been loath to collaborate in this extra-judicial act 
of state. Moreover, Annaeus Statius would have been conscious that his action of 
administering the poison could expose him to the charge of murder by poison 
(veneficium). The legal status of Annaeus Statius is unknown; however, as noted 
above, the great majority of even highly educated doctors were either slaves or 
freedmen.  
Veneficium was a capital offence for Roman citizens; slaves or freedmen found guilty, 
were crucified or condemned to fight wild animals.87 Moreover, under the resolution 
of the Roman Senate known as Senatusconsultum Silanianum (10 CE), if there was 
suspicion that a master had been killed by his slaves, his will could not be opened nor 
the inheritance acquired until all slaves and freedmen who lived with him “under the 
same roof” were subjected to examination and torture.88 Unless a murderer was found, 
all slaves would be condemned to death. For instance, in one of his letters to Titius 
Aristo89 Pliny asked the jurist for advice on procedural matters relating to a debate in 
the Senate on whether the freedmen of the deceased consul, Afranius Dexter, after 
being “put to the question”, should be acquitted, banished, or executed. Afranius 
Dexter was found dead, but it was uncertain: “whether had killed himself, or his 
servants were responsible; and if the latter, whether they acted criminally or in 
obedience to their master”. Given the harsh legal sanctions, there was very little 
incentive for either Roman citizens practicing medicine, or the medici slaves and 
freedmen to provide their patients or masters with poison.90  
The Senatusconsultum Silanianum was not invoked where the master committed 
suicide. However, slaves and freedmen were still punished if the master killed himself 
in their sight, and they did not prevent him from harming himself.91 In an example 
from a slightly later period (138 CE), it is unclear whether the ethical imperative, the 
fear of legal sanction or both led to the situation described by Aelius Spartianus, in his 
Historia Augusta92 whereby the dying Emperor Hadrian:  
… attempted to kill himself, but the dagger was taken from him. He then 
became more violent, and he even demanded poison from his physician, who 
thereupon killed himself in order that he might not have to administer it. 
*210 According to Cassius Dio,93 in desperation, Hadrian: “finally … abandoned his 
careful regimen [prescribed by Hermogenes, Hadrian's personal physician] and by 
indulging in unsuitable foods and drinks met his death.”  
Hadrian rejected medical advice and died through deliberate overindulgence. In 
contrast, Pliny's guardian, mentor and friend, Corellius Rufus,94 ended his life by 
refusing food offered to him by his physician. Sometime in late 96 or early 97 CE,95 
Pliny wrote thus to Calestrius Tiro:  
I have lost a very great man, if ‘loss’ is the right word for such a bereavement. 
Corellius Rufus has died, and died by his own wish, which makes me even sadder; for 
death is most tragic when it is not due to fate or natural causes. When we see men die 
of disease, at least we can find consolation in the knowledge that it is inevitable, but, 
when their end is self-sought, our grief is inconsolable because we feel that their lives 
could have been long.96 
Corellius Rufus developed hereditary gout97 at the age of thirty two. The decease, 
which initially affected his feet, was unremittingly progressive and agonizingly 
painful. At the age of sixty seven, Corellius composed a “balance sheet” whereby on 
the one side he evaluated his reasons for living (pretia vivendi), which included “a 
good conscience, good reputation, high authority, besides a daughter, a wife, a 
grandson, and sisters, and true friends”.98 On the other side he listed two major 
reasons for death (mortis rationibus). The first involved the fulfilment of his self-
defined raison d'être: in the late 80s he resolved to endure any pain and illness just to 
outlive Emperor Domitian, “that robber (latroni) if only by a single day”.99 With 
Domitian's demise, Corellius “felt free to die”. The second reason was the very pain 
he endured — the torture of the gout, which was spreading through all his limbs, and 
which he could no longer control through strict regimen of abstinence, moderate 
living and the sheer strength of mind. Corellius Rufus therefore decided that as his 
“perpetual” (chronic) disease grew progressively worse, he could only escape it by 
“severing all links with life”. For four days he refused all food (cibo). Neither his 
family nor his friends were able to persuade him to take nourishment. In classical 
Rome, just like today, doctors could not force treatment or nutrition upon a free and 
competent citizen. Indeed, Pliny admiringly reports that when the physician offered 
him food, Corellius Rufus replied: “kekrika” (Greek: “I have made my decision”).  
It appears that Corellius Rufus died within a week of his decision to refuse 
nourishment. In his deep sorrow, Pliny addressed Calestrius Tiro thus:  
Send me some words of comfort, but do not say that he was an old man and 
ill; I know this. What I need is something new and effective which I have 
never heard nor read about before, for everything I know comes naturally to 
my aid, but is powerless against grief like this.100 
Pliny's anguish was occasioned by the loss of a great friend through suicide, but not 
its mode. Abstaining from food as a method of hastening death was practiced in 
Ancient Greece and Rome. In Acute Diseases. 56 Hippocrates pointed out that the 
mistaken belief that hydromel (mead) weakened the body arose “through those 
abstaining to death”.101  
7. The requirement that the decision to exit life be rational  
Roman lawyers, as well as other Roman citizens, were aware that where the master's 
death was a result of treatment refusal and starvation, the household slaves and 
freedman would not be subject to sanctions under Senatusconsultum Silanianum 
(discussed above in relation to Afranius Dexter). Moreover, voluntary death by *211 
abstention from nourishment could only be achieved through “persistent resolution”, a 
quality essential to the Stoic notion of virtuous action.102 Corellius Rufus was able to 
endure “worthless” or “undeserved tortures” (indignissima tormenta) of his chronic 
and painful illness by “force of mind” (viribus animi sustinebat), and his decision to 
forego food was also governed by “supreme reason” (summa ratio). Hence, the 
conduct of Corellius Rufus was that of a rational Roman Stoic.103 In general, whether 
one followed Stoic or Epicurean ethics (which also emphasised reasoned choices), 
social and moral acceptability of voluntary death was strictly predicated on the 
rationality of the decision-making process.  
The “balance sheet” of Corellius Rufus illustrates the Roman process of reasoning 
that focused on balancing subjective experiences and desires of the patient against 
objective values and societal norms. The two had to run in tandem to be morally 
acceptable. Integral to the rational decision-making process was an examination of 
adverse consequences that the decision to “willingly exit life” would have not only for 
oneself but also for others. Moreover, unless the reasoning that led to the death-choice 
was coherent, it raised doubts about the rationality of the decision to end one's life. 
For example, Seneca the Younger recorded in De Vita Beata (On the Good Life) 19.1 
that the suicide of the Epicurean philosopher Diodorus was considered contrary to 
Epicurean doctrine because: “he cut his own throat. Some want this deed to be seen as 
madness, others as rashness.”104 Critical of Diodorus' suicide,105 Seneca underscored 
the irrationality of the act by juxtaposing the philosopher's declaration that he was 
“happy and full of good understanding” (beatus ac plenus bona conscientiae) when 
making his decision, with his parting words: “I have lived, and finished the course 
which fortune dealt me”.106 Although this sentence appears rational, it is in fact a 
direct quotation from the betrayed, distraught and suicidal Dido's final speech in 
Virgil's Aeneid 4.653.107  
Thus the appearance of lucidity was not sufficient to validate a death-choice. Roman 
law and ethics recognised competence in the legal sense as the ability to understand 
the significance of one's actions in terms of right or wrong.108 Juvenal, Roman 
satirical poet and contemporary of Pliny, expressed the foremost significance of 
“sound mind” (mens sana) in the sense of capacity for rational thought and action in 
the famous aphorism: “Our prayers should be for a sound mind in a healthy body.”109 
However, the presence of sound mind was important only insofar as it enabled 
competent persons to balance medical factors against the emotional costs and benefits, 
social commitments and philosophical values they espoused. In his Epistle 24 (On 
Despising Death), Seneca wrote:  
even when reason advises us to make an end of it, the impulse is not to be 
adopted without reflection or at headlong speed. The brave and wise man 
should not beat a hasty retreat from life; he should make a becoming exit. And 
above all, he should avoid the weakness which has taken possession of so 
many, — the lust of death. For just as there is an unreflecting tendency of the 
mind towards other things, so, … there is an unreflecting tendency towards 
death; this often seizes upon the noblest and most spirited men, as well as 
upon the craven and the abject. The former despise life; the latter find it 
irksome.110 
Diodorus may have been of sound mind, yet his suicide lacked moral legitimacy 
because he did not have sufficient motive and acted on an impulse.111 Pliny's opinion 
of Titius Aristo's conduct can serve as a counterpoint to Seneca's disapprobation of 
Diodorus, while reflecting the former's approach to decisions regarding voluntary 
death. Pliny, *212 having praised Titius Aristo's resolution to persevere with life 
despite his protracted and painful illness as “heroic” and “worthy the highest 
applause”, commented that:  
Many have his impulse and urge to hasten death, but the ability to deliberate 
and weight one's causes for such decision and to resolve to live or die 
according to the counsel of reason, is a mark of a truly great mind.112  
By contrasting impulsive decisions (like that of Diodorus), with those arrived at 
through rational and analytic process, Pliny pinpoints the standards (derived from the 
Stoic virtues in practical ethics) for assessing the legal and ethical validity of end-of-
life decision-making in classical Rome. The respective decisions of Titius Aristo and 
Corellius Rufus were virtuous and valid because they were made by competent 
persons, who carefully considered the physical, moral, social, and emotional 
consequences of each choice not only for them as individuals, but also for their 
families and friends. Moreover, each was prepared to take full moral responsibility for 
his actions (praxis).  
To conclude, what can the Romans teach us? Well, questions central to end of life 
decision-making have essentially remained the same over the past 2000 years. Since 
the middle of the nineteenth century, developments in medical science have made the 
works of Aulus Cornelius Celsus, Scribonius Largus, Pedanius Discorides, and 
Soranus of Ephesus of ethical rather than therapeutic importance. Nevertheless, their 
exposition of Hippocratic principles of right and wrong that govern the conduct of the 
medical profession is still pertinent. This is particularly so in cases of severe acute 
conditions, chronic illnesses with intractable pain (such a gout), and final stages of 
any disease, when the question arises whether the illness has exceeded the power of 
medicine to heal a particular patient. For although modern treatments are much better 
at curing disease, alleviating pain, and prolonging life, in some cases competent 
patients face choices, which are very similar to those that confronted Titius Aristo and 
Corellius Rufus.113 The difference lies in emphasis on the principles and standards 
governing decision-making and its acceptability in classical Rome and at present.  
Roman citizens had a legal right to “voluntarily exit” life, yet they did not equate all 
decisions to exercise this right with moral and social legitimacy. To attain ethical (and 
social) legitimacy, both the decision and the decision-making process had to be 
rational. In relation to “reasonable removal”, an unimpaired cognitive capacity to 
process and understand information, and to choose between alternatives (as Diodotus 
did), was insufficient — the decision had to be a product of moral reflection that was 
neither self-centred nor patently unwise. Our society, as reflected through legislation 
and case-law, having elevated the doctrine of personal autonomy to an absolute right 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment,114 focuses strictly on the patient's sound mind.115 
Questions of moral values, personal and social impact of a death-choice are 
subordinated to the cognitively competent patient's wish,116 no matter how impulsive, 
irrational, or unbalanced it might be. Inherent in this narrow – cognition-oriented – 
approach to the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment is the risk of harm to 
some of the most vulnerable members of our society. For a decision to end one's life 
voluntarily once carried out cannot be unmade. Romans realised that there is no room 
for mistakes when it comes to a death-choice: hence their insistence on both, its 
rationality and ethical acceptability. Perhaps it is time to re-consider the modern 
approach to the refusal of life sustaining medical treatment and the notion of an 
absolute personal right to self-determination in relation to death-choices.  
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